Skip to main content

Sandboxing

WednesdayAI can run tools inside Docker containers to reduce blast radius. Sandboxing is optional and off by default; when it is off, tools run on the host with the same permissions as the gateway process. The gateway process itself always stays on the host — only tool execution moves into a container. This is not a perfect security boundary, but it materially limits filesystem and process access when the model does something it should not.
When sandbox.mode is off (the default), tool code runs with the same permissions as the gateway process. Install only plugins you trust, and consider enabling a sandbox for non-main sessions.

What gets sandboxed

  • Tool execution: exec, read, write, edit, apply_patch, process, and similar.
  • An optional sandboxed browser (agents.defaults.sandbox.browser).
Not sandboxed:
  • The gateway process itself.
  • Any tool explicitly allowed to run on the host — in particular, elevated exec runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.

Modes

agents.defaults.sandbox.mode controls when sandboxing is used:
non-main is based on session.mainKey (default "main"), not agent id. Group and channel sessions use their own keys, so they count as non-main and will be sandboxed in non-main mode — a common surprise.

Scope

agents.defaults.sandbox.scope controls how many containers are created:

Workspace access

agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess controls what the sandbox can see: Inbound media is copied into the active sandbox workspace (media/inbound/*). With workspaceAccess: "none", eligible skills are mirrored into the sandbox workspace so the (sandbox-rooted) read tool can see them.

Custom bind mounts

agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.binds mounts additional host directories. Format: host:container:mode, e.g. "/home/user/source:/source:ro". Global and per-agent binds are merged (under scope: "shared", per-agent binds are ignored).
Binds bypass the sandbox filesystem and expose host paths with whatever mode you set. WednesdayAI blocks dangerous sources (docker.sock, /etc, /proc, /sys, /dev, and parent mounts that would expose them). Mount secrets and credentials :ro unless absolutely required — binding /var/run/docker.sock effectively hands host control to the sandbox.

Images and setup

The default image is openclaw-sandbox:bookworm-slim. Build it once:
The default image does not include Node. For a richer image with curl, jq, nodejs, python3, and git:
For the sandboxed browser:
By default, sandbox containers run with no network (docker.network: "none"). Override with agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network. network: "host" and network: "container:<id>" are blocked by default; the namespace-join break-glass override is agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.dangerouslyAllowContainerNamespaceJoin: true. openclaw doctor checks the sandbox image and offers to build or switch it when sandboxing is enabled but the image is missing.

Sandbox vs tool policy vs elevated

Three related but distinct controls decide whether a tool runs and where:
  1. Sandbox (agents.defaults.sandbox.*) decides where tools run — Docker vs host.
  2. Tool policy (tools.*, tools.sandbox.tools.*, agents.list[].tools.*) decides which tools are available.
  3. Elevated (tools.elevated.*) is an exec-only escape hatch to run on the host while sandboxed.
Rules of thumb:
  • Tool policy is the hard stop. deny always wins; if allow is non-empty, everything else is blocked.
  • Tool policy applies before sandbox rules — sandboxing never re-enables a denied tool.
  • /exec only adjusts per-session exec defaults for authorized senders; it cannot override a denied exec tool.
  • Elevated does not grant extra tools and does not override allow/deny. /elevated on runs exec on the host (approvals may still apply); /elevated full skips exec approvals for the session.

Debugging “why is this blocked?”

It prints the effective sandbox mode, scope, and workspace access, whether the current session is sandboxed, the effective sandbox tool allow/deny (and where it came from), and the elevated gates with fix-it config keys.

Tool groups

Sandbox tool policy accepts group:* shorthands:

Minimal enable example


Related: Security hardening · Gateway configuration · Doctor